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In this paper we estimate the effect of the Mexican conditional cash transfer program, 
Oportunidades, on consumption, and we explore some issues related to participation to the 
program and to the estimation of treatment effects. We discuss the comparability of treatment 
and control areas, provide evidence that the expected transfer may not be sufficiently high to 
induce many eligible households to participate, and find positive effects on consumption. 
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also grateful to Joseph Cullen. 1 Introduction
Conditional cash transfers programs are becoming increasingly popular both in developing and
developed countries. While their e®ects on school enrollment, academic achievement, nutri-
tional and health status of children have been studied extensively, their impact on consumption
has received slightly less attention, although some studies now address that issue (see Hoddinot
and Skou¯as 2003 and Gertler, Martinez and Rubio 2006). Yet, the study of consumption can
be very useful for several reasons. First, a presumption of the conditional cash transfers, as an
alternative to transfers in kind, is that poor households have better information on the most
pro¯table activities in which to invest.1 Thus, it is important to check what happens to the
bene¯ciaries' budget after they receive a transfer and how they allocate the transfer between
di®erent activities. Consumption (and its structure) is obviously an important part of the story
here. Second, when the estimation of the impact e®ects cannot rely on a randomized trial and
is based instead on quasi-experimental methods, such as di®erence-in-di®erence and matching,
the consumption results can be used as an important indirect diagnostic of the assumptions
employed by these methods. We can put reasonable bounds on the short run e®ects of the grant
on consumption. It is unlikely, for instance, that poor households increase their consumption
by an amount substantially larger than the amount of the grant, at least in the short run. It is
also unlikely that the same poor households save a very large fraction of the grant. By compar-
ing the results one obtains with these priors, one can judge the plausibility of the methodology
employed in estimating a variety of impacts.
This paper studies the e®ect of the urban component of Oportunidades on the consumption
of bene¯ciary households. To estimate this impact we have to tackle a number of methodological
problems. First and foremost, unlike the rural component of the program, previously known as
PROGRESA, the allocation of Oportunidades across urban areas was not random. We therefore
1The imposition of conditionalities, however, moderates this assertion.
2use a combination of di®erence in di®erence matching and instrumental variable estimators. We
discuss at length the plausibility of the assumptions employed and the problem that the data
present in this respect. Second, the take up of the program in urban areas was, relatively to the
rural component, quite low: about 50% of the eligible households registered for the program.
The limited participation drives a wedge between the Average Intent to Treat (AIT), which is
the e®ect on the eligible population irrespective of whether they participate to the program, and
the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT). Exploring the determinants of participation is
also interesting in its own right. Therefore, we discuss some key correlates of program take-up,
showing that participation is strongly correlated with poverty status and it is higher among
families with children who were already attending school before the beginning of the program.
We ¯nd that households spend about 80% of the transfer, that they use it primarily to
purchase more food, and that the amount consumed increases over time. These results are
similar to the ¯ndings from the rural component of the program.
2 Oportunidades: program and data characteristics
The Oportunidades program, then named PROGRESA, started in 1998 in rural Mexico. In
2003, the program was expanded to urban areas. The urban program di®ered from its ru-
ral counterpart in two important ways: ¯rst, in the targeting and registration of bene¯ciary
households, and second, in the design of the evaluation. In the rural localities targeted by
PROGRESA, each households knew its eligibility status before the beginning of the program.
Subsequently, the take up rate was around 97%. In urban areas, instead, the program oper-
ated setting up registration o±ces (m¶ odulos) within eligible areas, and investing resources in
spreading the news about the availability of the program in that area. Potential bene¯ciaries
had to visit a local o±ce ¯rst, and then found out whether they quali¯ed for the program,
based on an estimated poverty status. The consequence of this scheme was that, at least in the
3¯rst two years of operation, many potentially eligible households did not apply for the program
- possibly because they were not aware of its existence, or because of uncertainty over their
eligibility status, or because Oportunidades was simply less attractive in urban areas than rural
areas. Indeed, administrative data indicate that the program take-up is approximately 50%.
As for the evaluation, the rural component used the gradual expansion of the program to
set up a randomized trial. A representative sample of 506 villages was drawn. In 320 randomly
selected localities the program started in 1998, while in the remaining 186, the program would
not start until the end of 1999. In urban areas, the expansion of the program was not random,
but had the following procedure. The unit of analysis was the \manzana", or city block.
First, the administration decided to initially o®er the program in the blocks with the highest
density of poor households. It selected the poorest blocks using poverty data from the 2000
census. Second, it estimated a propensity score at the block level to predict the probability
that each block is o®ered the program. It then selected a representative sample of treatment
\manzanas", matching them to a sample of \manzanas" from control areas with similar values of
the propensity score. Obviously, certain area-level variables that would discriminate perfectly
between treatment and control areas - e.g. the poverty density - were excluded from the
propensity score.
Since the treatment and control sample are necessarily unbalanced in terms of these area
level variables, the availability of a baseline survey, collected before the start of the program,
is crucial, as it allows us to control for time-invariant unobservable di®erences. Besides having
di®erent proportions of poor households, treatment and control blocks di®er also in the geo-
graphic distribution, as they are partly sampled from di®erent states. We will come back to
these issues when we discuss di®erential trends.
A further issue arises from the fact that the data are \choice-based", as they over-sample
program participants. Thus, the fraction of eligible (i.e. poor) households participating into
4the program observed in our treatment sample is di®erent from the true fraction of program
participants. Fortunately, we can estimate the true proportion of participating households in
each block from a di®erent data set.2
The data used in this paper consist of the three waves of the urban evaluation sample
Encelurb. The ¯rst wave was collected in 2002, after households had registered for Oportu-
nidades, but before any payments had been made. The data come from 905 di®erent blocks or
\manzanas" in urban areas, 486 of which are treated, while the remaining 419 are not.
We had to drop from the analysis some households with insu±cient information to calculate
the poverty index, which in turn is used to classify them as potential bene¯ciaries or not. We
explored the issue of non-random attrition in the overall sample and, in particular the possibility
that the attrition rate di®er signi¯cantly between treatment and control areas. We measured an
overall attrition rate of about 8% for poor households: we end up with data on 9192 households
in 2004, from an initial sample of 9945 in 2002. Importantly, this attrition does not appear to
be related to the area type. In 2004 we observe about 91% and 93% of the initial sample of
households from treatment and control areas, respectively and we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the attrition rate is the same in the two areas.
The information on consumption in the data set is remarkably detailed. We have informa-
tion on the consumption of many types of food in the week prior to the interview, including the
monetary value of consumption in kind as given by the respondents (either grown or received
as pay or as a gift). We also know the value of expenditures for a long list of non-durable com-
modities: household-related goods, transport, personal care, education, children's and adult
clothes, health, alcohol and tobacco, furniture, and entertainment. We transform all the ¯gures
to monthly equivalents. About 10% of the observations are missing for both food and non-food
items, although the occurrence of missing observations does not seem to be related systemati-
2See Angelucci, Attanasio, and Shaw (2004) for further details.
5cally to wealth.3 After dropping observations with incomplete or missing responses, as well as
trimming the top and bottom percentile of our food and non-food consumption measures, we
are left with data on the change in consumption from its 2002 value for approximately 7320
and 6830 households in 2003 and 2004. The availability of pre-program data enables us to
implement di®erence-in-di®erence estimators. The advantage of this class of estimators is that
the required assumptions are on the change in the variable of interest, rather than on its level.
In Table 1 we report the means for non durable consumption divided in food and non-food.
Food is the most important item in these households budgets, consistent with the fact that our
sample includes very poor households, and the average share of food in total consumption is
roughly 60%. It is worth noting that control households exhibit signi¯cantly higher levels of
consumption in 2002. In 2003, these di®erences have diminished considerably, especially for
food, and in 2004 they have vanished altogether. Clearly the impact of Oportunidades has
something to do with these results.
The level of total consumption is interesting because it gives an idea of how important
the Oportunidades transfer is. As shown below, the average monthly transfers for treated
households are 342 and 406 pesos in 2003 and 2004. This implies that the transfer was worth
between 17% and 21% of overall 2002 consumption on average. For participant households who,
as we will see, tend to be poorer than non-participant households, the grant might represent
an even larger fraction of total consumption.
Interestingly, the average level of consumption is much lower than average monthly income
(average consumption in 2002 is 1929 pesos in treatment areas and 2149 pesos in control areas,
compared with average income of 3099 pesos and 3210 pesos). Such a large di®erence is unlikely
to be consistent with the low level of savings (less than 100 pesos on average) and is even more
3We considered missing all food and non-food consumption observations with at least 30% missing data. That
is, for food consumption we dropped observations that had more than 12 missing food consumption data (out
of a total of 37 food categories). For non-food consumption, we dropped observations with more than 9 missing
non-food consumption data (out of a total of 30 categories).
6puzzling if we consider the fact that consumption includes consumption in kind, while income
does not. These numbers indicate either an over-estimation of income levels or, perhaps more
likely (given that housing costs are excluded), an underestimate of consumption levels. The
average transfers in 2003 and 2004 are respectively 11% and 13% of pre-program household
income; thus, considered as a fraction of income, the program monetary incentives may not be
very appealing. We will explore these issues later.
In Table 2, we report participation into the program and the average amounts received,
according to the administrative data, in 2003 and 2004. It should be noticed that the annual
averages mask a substantial amount of variation over the year, as the educational grants are
typically not paid when the school is in recess, from July to September. Overall, 51.8% of
eligible households participate to the program in 2003, and participation increases only by 2
percentage points in 2004. While one might have speculated that the low participation in
the early stages of the program could have been due to poor information about the program
existence, it seem unlikely that potential recipients would not know of it one year after its start.
We will explore participation issues in Section 5.
3 Identi¯cation of treatment e®ects
We are interested in estimating the average e®ect of the treatment on the treated (ATT).
However, given the low participation rate, the average intention to treat (AIT), is also of
interest. In this section we outline our identi¯cation strategy.
We identify the ATT using a conditional version of the Local Average Treatment E®ect
(Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996) and of the Bloom estimator (Bloom 1984, and Heckman
1996), where the availability of the treatment is not random, unlike in the other papers men-
tioned. Our data consist of a sample of poor households who live in two types of blocks: blocks
where the program is o®ered to poor households (Z = 1) and blocks where the program is
7not implemented (Z = 0). We label these two types of geographic areas \program blocks"
and \non-program blocks". We observe outcomes for households in both block types at time
t1, almost one year after the implementation of Oportunidades, and at time t0, prior to the
program start. The treatment consists of participation to Oportunidades.
Given these data, we de¯ne potential outcomes for household i at time t1 as Yit1(1) in
the presence of the treatment, Dit1 = 1, and Yit1(0) without the treatment, Dit1 = 0. The
relationship between potential and observed outcomes is Yit1 = Yit1(1)Dit1 + Yit1(0)(1 ¡ Dit1)
and we observe only one potential outcome per household at each point in time. The variable
Z is our instrument. De¯ne potential participation of a household i at time t1 as a function
of the instrument: Dit1(1) is potential participation where the household to live in a program
block and Dit1(0) is potential participation if living in non-program blocks. Participation
is zero by de¯nition in non-program blocks, as the program is not implemented there, i.e.
Dit1(0) = 0. Therefore, the relationship between observed and potential outcomes is Dit1 =
Dit1(1)Zit1 + Dit1(0)(1 ¡ Zit1) = Dit1(1)Zit1.
The average treatment e®ect on the treated is:
ATT = E[Yit1(1) ¡ Yit1(0)jDit1 = 1]
Our key identi¯cation assumption is that, conditional on a set of observable characteristics
measured in a pre-program time period t = t0, Xit0, area of residence is independent of the
potential treatment Dit1(1) and Dit1(0) and of the change in potential outcomes ¢Yit(1) =
Y (1)it1¡Y (1)it0 and ¢Yit(0) = Y (0)it1¡Y (0)it0, i.e. Zi?¢Yit(0);¢Yit(1);Dit1(0);Dit1(1)jXit0.
That is, we allow residents of program and non-program blocks to have di®erent levels of
potential outcomes, but the di®erences are time-invariant, therefore they disappear by taking
their ¯rst di®erence.4 Z has a positive causal e®ect on participation, that is E[Dit1(1)] > 0.
4One can express potential outcomes as composed of two separate terms, one a function of X and the
other of Z, and this latter term is time invariant and constant across both potential outcomes: Y (J)it1 =
8Given our assumptions, we can de¯ne the ATT as
ATT = E[Yit1(1) ¡ Yit1(0)jDit1(1) = 1]
From the above assumptions (and dropping the subscripts for expositional ease) it follows that
E[¢Y jZ = 1;X] ¡ E[¢Y jZ = 0;X] =
E[¢Y (1)D(1) + ¢Y (0)(1 ¡ D(1))jZ = 1;X] ¡ E[¢Y (0)jZ = 0;X] =
E[¢Y (1) ¡ ¢Y (0)jD(1) = 1;X]P(D(1) = 1jX) + E[¢Y (0)jX] ¡ E[¢Y (0)jX] =
E[Y (1) ¡ Y (0)jD(1) = 1;X]P(D = 1jZ = 1;X)
This notation implicitly assumes that potential outcomes for each subject are not a®ected
by the treatment status of others.5 The last equality follows from footnote 4 and from the
conditional independence of Z from potential treatment, P(D(1) = 1jX) = P(D(1) = 1jZ =
1;X) = P(D = 1jZ = 1;X). Thus, the ATT for individuals with characteristics X, ATTX, can
be estimated as the ratio between the expected di®erence in observed outcomes in treatment
and control areas and the observed probability of participation in treatment areas. We can
express this as a function of the propensity score P(X) = P(Z = 1jX) (Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983):
ATTP(X) = E[Y (1) ¡ Y (0)jD(1) = 1;P(X)] =
E[¢Y jZ = 1;P(X)] ¡ E[¢Y jZ = 0;P(X)]
P(D = 1jZ = 1;P(X))




ATTP(X)=pdF(pjD = 1) (1)
With this approach one normally identi¯es the LATE, i.e. the average treatment e®ect for
Yit1(J;X) + Ui(Z), with J = f0;1g. ¢Yit(J) = Yit1(J;X) ¡ Yit0(J;X). Note that Y (1;X)it0 = Y (0;X)it0
because the treatment has not started in t = t0. Therefore, Y (1)it1 ¡ Y (0)it1 = Y (1;X)it1 ¡ Y (0;X)it1 and
¢Y (1)it ¡ ¢Y (0)it = Y (1)it1 ¡ Y (0)it1.
5This is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), formalized by Rubin (1980, 1986).
9the set of agents who are induced to participate in the program because of the instrument. In
this particular case, though, our subjects consist only of \never-takers" (D(1) = D(0) = 0)
and \takers" (D(1) = 1 and D(0) = 0), as we have neither \always-takers" nor \de¯ers"
(Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). Therefore, the subjects who are induced to participate in
the program because they are o®ered the treatment are all the treated subjects (Angrist and
Imbens 1994).6
Lastly, note that the numerator of ATTP(X) is the average intent to treat (AIT) for in-
dividuals with a given value of the propensity score P(X). The AIT measures the e®ect of
the program on eligible subjects, regardless of whether they participate in the program or not.
Since often the policy maker has little in°uence on participation, the AIT is one relevant pa-
rameters for policy analysis. The AIT is also interesting for the following two reasons. First,
because it provides a lower bound to the ATT under the assumption that the program e®ect
on non participants in the treatment group is lower than its e®ect on participants.7 Second,
because the identi¯cation of AIT requires less restrictive identi¯cation assumptions than that
of ATT, as it e®ectively ignores the issue of what determines participation in the program. In
this case the AIT is identi¯ed under the assumptions that the program has no e®ect in control
areas, that the changes in potential consumption in treatment and control areas are indepen-
dent of areas of residence, conditional on observables, and that there is full common support,
P(Z = 1jX) < 1.
Since only about half of the eligible households enrolled in the program and spillover e®ects
to eligible non-participants are unlikely, we expect the AIT to be substantially smaller than
the ATT. For example, if the program e®ect were homogeneous, the AIT would be half the
6There are other possible alternative approaches within the matching framework to the estimation of the
ATT parameter. For instance, one could match eligible participants and non-participants in treatment areas,
or participants and poor households from control areas. For more details on these alternative approaches, and
why we believe our method of choice is more appropriate given the available data, see Angelucci and Attanasio
(2006).
7The lower bound refers to a positive ATT, and further assumes that any e®ect of the treatment on eligible
non-participants is smaller than the one on participants. See Hirano et al. (2000) for an application in which
this latter assumption is violated.
10magnitude of the ATT in the absence of spillover e®ects.
4 Are the identi¯cation assumptions credible?
The identi¯cation of both the AIT and the ATT is based on three assumptions: SUTVA, condi-
tional independence (CIA), and common support. In this section we discuss their plausibility.
We believe the SUTVA holds in these data. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2007) found that
program recipients from rural areas share their transfer with ineligible households who live in
the same village, increasing this latter group's consumption. However, for our identi¯cation
assumption to hold we only require eligible participants to not share their transfer with eligible
non-participants. It seems improbable that individuals who choose to not participate despite
being eligible for the program, would later receive money or gifts from participants. Moreover
the indirect e®ects in rural areas occur only about one year after the beginning of the program;
therefore, it is unlikely that we could ¯nd such e®ects in urban areas in 2003, less than one year
after the treatment started. For the 2004 data, if there are any positive indirect program e®ect
to eligible non-participants, we will end up estimating an upper bound to the true ATT.8
The SUTVA is violated also if eligible participants share their transfer with members of
their social network who live in non-program blocks and are su±ciently poor to have quali¯ed
for the program, had it been implemented in their city block. While in principle this is possible,
in practice we expect that the likelihood of these latter households' being sampled is very small.
In any case, if this were the case, (1) would estimate a lower bound to the ATT.
The CIA is a more problematic assumption in our data, ¯rst, because the areas where the
program is implemented and the control areas have di®erent poverty levels, and second because
these areas are geographically unbalanced. While observing pre-program data enables us to
control for time-invariant di®erences, it may be that areas with di®erent poverty levels or from
8Spillover e®ects can also occur through their e®ect on prices and on the functioning of markets, among other
ways. However, we believe this is unlikely to hold in our data.
11di®erent local economies also have di®erent growth rates. Heckman, Hichimura, and Todd
(1997) show that sampling treatment and control subjects from di®erent geographic areas may
bias the estimates of the treatment e®ects, and that standard identi¯cation methods, such as
di®erence-in-di®erence matching estimators, may not perform well in these circumstances.
Table 3 shows that the sampled areas are unbalanced at the geographic level: the proportion
of treatment and control areas varies considerably by federal state; in Campeche, Morelos, and
San Luis Potosi', there are treatment areas, but no control ones. This lack of balance at the
geographic level may be problematic, if, for example, states have di®erent local business cycles
that a®ect the change in consumption. Indeed, there is substantial variation in GDP growth at
the state level. The weighted average of the growth rates is signi¯cantly lower in program than
in non-program blocks in 1999 and 2000, not statistically di®erent in 2001, and signi¯cantly
higher in 2002.9 Thus, program blocks experienced higher growth than non-program blocks at
baseline.10
To provide further evidence on the possibility of di®erential trends between treatment and
control areas, we compare the pre-program trends of the three variables for which we have
pre-2002 data. These are income, household head and spouse employment, which we observe
since 1999. Ideally, we would like to see whether there are di®erential trends after the program
is implemented, but a comparison of post-program observed outcomes is uninformative because
the trend is likely a®ected by the program in treatment areas. Instead, we compare pre-program
trends in observable variables. If there are di®erential trends in observable variables, it is
possible that there may also be di®erential trends in unobservables, and that these di®erential
trends may continue when the program starts.
For each of these three variables (Y ), we estimated two sets of regression using 1999 to 2002
data. One is a regression on di®erent continuous time trends (t) as second-order polynomials
9We estimated these e®ects weighting each state proportionally to the frequency of sampled households.
10The values of the di®erences (and standard errors) from 1999 to 20002 are respectively -0.015 (0.009), -0.017
(0.004), -0.005 (0.004), and 0.011 (0.003), clustering the standard errors at the state level.
12by block type.11 The other interacts a treatment area dummy (T) with year dummies (y):
Yit = ®0 + ®1Tit + ®2tt + ®3t2
t + ®4Tittt + ®5Titt2
t + uit







A test of the joint signi¯cance of ®4 + ®5 and tests of the signi¯cance of the ¯3j coe±cients
are evidence of di®erential trends. We report these estimates in Table 4. In addition, we show
these trends in Figures 1, 2, and 3.
The evidence suggests that income has a signi¯cantly di®erent trend in treatment and
control areas; the trend in spouse employment also appears to be di®erent (although we cannot
reject the hypothesis of di®erential quadratic trends). Lastly, household heads' employment
does not vary di®erentially across treatment and control areas. In both cases, the growth is
higher in treatment areas especially between 2001 and 2002, as with the growth rates. While
we can control for these observable di®erences, it is likely that treatment areas also have steeper
trends in unobservable variables. Failure to control for these trends would result in upward-
biased estimates of the AIT and ATT, erroneously showing part of the fastest unobservable
growth in treatment areas as a consequence of the program.
As a further robustness check, we tested for di®erential trends between quasi-poor house-
holds in treatment and control areas. These are households not su±ciently poor to be eligible
for the program. Under the assumption of no program spillover e®ects, we compare both pre-
and post-program trends for these households. If the quasi-poor and the poor are su±ciently
similar, one could consider the evidence of di®erential trend among the quasi-poor as suggestive
that such di®erences may occur among the poor too. While we failed to detect di®erences for
income and household head employment, spouse employment in treatment areas is slower than
11We do not report speci¯cations with linear trends because we could never reject the hypothesis that these
trends di®er by area type.
13in control areas between 1999 and 2001, and then grows faster between 2001 and 2003.12
One possibility to address the issue of di®erential trends would be to include state dummies
in the set of conditioning variables, assuming that di®erences in areas' geographic distribution
are an important potential cause for di®erent unobserved trends. Since the outcome variable is
in ¯rst di®erence, adding state dummies allows for state-speci¯c trends. However, this causes
problems with the quality of the matches, as we will show below. An alternative possibility
would be to condition on state GDP growth. Adding this variable to the set of covariates would
account for di®erential trends between control and treatment areas, under the assumption that
unobservable trends are a function of state growth rates.
To provide indirect evidence that state-speci¯c growth accounts for some of the time-varying
di®erences between treatment and control localities, we show that the di®erential growth rate
in income disappears when we regress household income growth rate on GDP growth rate. As
Table 5 shows, the coe±cient of the treatment dummy is no longer signi¯cant once we add
state GDP growth (column 2). Interestingly, conditioning on state dummies does not change
the signi¯cance of the treatment coe±cient (column 3).13 Note, however, that the absence
of a signi¯cant di®erence of income growth once we condition on state GDP growth does not
guarantee that the latter can successfully control for unobservable di®erences in trends.
This discussion leads to our third identi¯cation assumption, common support. Since treat-
ment assignment is not randomized, the selection of variables for the propensity score is a
crucial step in the estimation of treatment e®ects. This assumption di®ers from the previous
two, since it is directly observable, and depends on the set of covariates we condition on. While
all the applications that use matching methods have a trade o® between conditioning on a large
set of covariates that a®ect both participation and potential outcomes (making the CIA more
12Results available upon request.
13We repeated the same exercise for the ¯rst di®erence in income and employment for household head and
spouse, and for the growth rate of head and spouse employment growth rate at the locality level, but these
variables were never di®erent between treatment and control areas, irrespective of whether we condition on GDP
or not.
14credible) and having good support properties (i.e. a su±ciently large number of matches for
each treated subject), in this case the dilemma is especially strong for the two aforementioned
reasons: 1) di®erent poverty rates and 2) di®erent geographic location between the two block
types. For this reason we present estimates of the propensity score that use di®erent sets of
covariates and discuss the validity of the CIA and common support assumptions under these
alternative speci¯cations.
Figure 4 shows the frequencies of the propensity scores. Some household-level variables,
Xh, are common to all speci¯cations. These are (using 2002 values, unless otherwise speci¯ed):
household size dummies, number of children by age categories (0 to 5, 6 to 12, 13 to 15, and 16 to
20) grouped according to their status (working, going to school, or neither), poverty index as a
second-order polynomial (program eligibility is based on this index), income (as a second-order
polynomial), savings (excluding domestic helpers and their relatives, and individuals whose
relationship to other family members is missing) and debt, transitory shocks in 2002 such as
death or illness of non-resident family member, job or business loss for resident family member,
and whether the household su®ered a natural disaster, doctor visits in the previous four weeks
for children, head, and spouse (as three separate dummies); household head's and spouse's
presence (including multiple heads), gender, literacy, education dummies (the categories are: no
quali¯cation, incomplete primary, complete primary, incomplete secondary, complete secondary,
higher education), employment status in 2002 (employee or self-employed, the excluded category
is unemployed), dummies for whether either head or spouse worked in 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and income of head and partner in 2001, 2000, 1999 (as a linear term).
The top left panel of Figure 4, panel 1, also adds the following set of area-speci¯c variables,
Xa: availability of primary, middle and secondary schools, and health centers (measured by
number of facilities per resident), dummies for area size, poverty incidence (as a second-order
polynomial), and number of households. All variables are measured at baseline, 2002. Moreover,
15we condition on dummies for receipt of welfare assistance in the previous 12 months, ownership
of durable assets (car, truck, appliances, and home), and dwelling characteristics.14;15 The
advantage of this propensity score is that it is based on a large set of household and area
characteristics, making the CIA assumption quite believable. However, since area poverty level
is one of the criteria to select treatment \manzanas" (the treated areas are the poorest ones),
there is hardly any common support.
In panel 2 we drop all area variables and all the additional household-speci¯c variables,
keeping only the Xh covariates. Note that we drop the additional household-speci¯c variables
because they are used to compute the household poverty level, which we condition on.16 Now
there is complete common support. However, we suspect that in this way we may not be
controlling for di®erential trends in treatment and control areas, making the CIA assumption
questionable. Before discussing the other speci¯cations, note that the comparison of panels 1
and 2 clearly highlights that, although the characteristics of households in program and non-
program blocks appear to be fairly similar overall (i.e. the distribution of the propensity score
in panel 2 does not di®er substantially for control and treatment households), the areas they
live in are not. There is nothing that can be done about this issue: it is an undesirable, yet
unavoidable feature of this evaluation exercise.
The score in panel 3 has state dummies in addition to the variables used in panel 2. In
this way, we control for unobserved average area characteristics at the state level that might
a®ect the change in consumption. We still have full common support, but the right tail of
the distribution has a high density for households in program blocks, while it is very thin in
non-program blocks. Consequently, the estimation in this part of the support will not be very
14We have information on receipt of each of the following programs: free tortilla, Liconsa or Conasupo milk,
school breakfast, DIF, scholarship, transportation scholarhsip, INI, Probecat \alianza para el campo", \apoyo
a la vivienda", Procampo, credit, Fonaes, PET, funds to micro, small, or medium entreprises, other state or
municipal programs, and \seguro Popular".
15The dwelling characteristics are °oor, roof, and walls materials, number of rooms, existence of water piping
and of a bathroom.
16Dropping the household poverty level from the propensity score in panel 1 does not a®ect its support.
16precise. Panel 4 replaces state dummies with state annual GDP growth between 2000 and 2002;
there is a substantial di®erence in the distribution of the propensity score between these latter
two panels. Unlike in panel 2, now there is evidence of higher probability of participation in
program blocks (which is what we expect since they do di®er from non-program blocks), but
there are fewer bad matches than in panel 3. Lastly, panels 5 and 6 use the covariates in 3 and
4, adding availability of primary, lower and upper secondary schools, and health centers, each
measured by number of facilities per resident. We think that conditioning on these variables
is potentially important because the availability of schools and medical centers may strongly
in°uence both participation and outcome. However, in both cases the propensity score has
a very thick right tail for treatment households, resulting in many bad matches. Although
the common support assumption does not fail, we are concerned that estimates of treatment
e®ects based on these propensity scores would not be very informative because we would end
up comparing very di®erent individuals.
In sum, adding area-level variables, which is the best approach in principle, creates zero
common support. This is a re°ection of the fact there is no overlap in aggregate poverty shares
between treatment and control areas by construction. Adding state dummies may strike the
right balance between satisfying the full common support condition, controlling for important
determinants of both participation and outcome, and allowing for di®erences is area charac-
teristics that might result in di®erent unobservable trends for treatment and control localities.
However, for about 50% of the treated households we have hardly any counterfactual. If we
replace state dummies with state GDP growth between 2000 and 2002, we reduce the number
of \bad" matches in the right tail of the distribution. While on one hand it is less clear whether
we are properly controlling for di®erential trends, on the other hand the evidence from Table
5 shows that GDP growth, unlike state dummies, explains some of the di®erential variation in
income growth by area type.
17Note that the area variables we omit from the computation of the propensity score are
signi¯cant predictors of area of residence. However, our identi¯cation assumption is that,
conditional on the variables we do include to estimate the propensity score, these omitted
variables are unrelated to changes in potential outcomes.
5 Program participation
As mentioned in Section 2, the take up rate of Oportunidades in urban areas is around 50%
even in 2004, more than one year after the program start. Understanding the reasons for such
a low take-up rate has important policy implications. In particular, it would be interesting
to understand by what extent the low participation rate is due to lack of information about
the program's existence and features, uncertainty about eligibility (applicants ¯nd out whether
they are eligible for the program only after going to the application center), and inadequate
monetary incentives. However, we do not have data on the intensity of program advertising, nor
obvious sources of exogenous variation to identify these causal e®ects. Therefore, we will simply
describe some characteristics of program participants, and discuss possible interpretations of
these results. Although these correlates are not causal e®ects, they may provide useful insights
about the process of self-selection in the program.
We estimate the probability of program participation for eligible households in treatment
areas, P(D = 1jX;Z = 1) as a function of a large set of household and area characteristics,
speci¯cally the Xh and Xa covariates and the dummies for receipt of welfare assistance. Table
6 shows the e®ects of number of children by age categories varies according to their 2002 status
(working, going to school, or neither). An increase in the number of children neither going
to school nor working does not change the likelihood of being a program recipient, with the
exception of children aged 0 to 5; the participation rate drops by 2.3% points for each extra
child in this age group. This result may be due to the higher opportunity cost of leaving the
18house for mothers of very young children. On the other hand, having young children who go
to school is associated with signi¯cantly higher probabilities of participation. The likelihood
of being a program recipient is 3.6 and 5.5 percentage points higher for any child aged 6 to
12 and 13 to 15 who was attending school before the program started, while elder children's
school attendance does not a®ect take-up rates. Lastly, child employment is correlated with
lower take-up rates; the probability of participation is 6.5 and 4.0 percentage points lower for
any child aged 13 to 15 and 16 to 20 who was working in 2002. These results indicate that
program participation is much higher among families whose kids would have gone to school
irrespective of the program.
One possible explanation consistent with these ¯ndings is that the monetary incentives
o®ered are probably not su±cient to induce some potential participants to move children from
employment to schooling. To further investigate this issue, we looked at child employment.
In program blocks, 16.2% and 43.7% of eligible respondents aged 13 to 15, and 16 to 20,
respectively, had a job in 2002, with average monthly wages of 885 and 1451 pesos (and median
wages of 800 and 1310 pesos). The monthly scholarship for program participants in 2003,
however, was between 305 and 390 pesos for enrollment in lower secondary education (grades 7
to 9), and between 510 and 660 pesos for upper secondary enrollment (grades 10 to 12). These
transfers amount to 270, 345, 451, and 584 pesos at 2002 prices. Thus, the opportunity cost of
switching from employment to schooling is much higher in urban than in rural areas, where the
scholarships were between one half and two thirds of children's full time wages (Schultz 2004),
and where the participation rates were much higher.
Table 7 reports the partial e®ects of consumption, poverty level, income, transitory shocks,
and availability of schools and health centers. This table shows three things. First, poverty
is a strong correlate of participation. According to the estimated e®ects, the household in the
75% percentile of the poverty distribution, which has a poverty level of 2.01, is 16 percentage
19points or 69% more likely to be a program participant than the household in the 25% percentile,
which has a poverty level of 1.04. Second, the concentration of health centers in the block is
positively related to participation. The magnitude of the e®ect, however, is quite small, as the
inter-quartile range in this case is only 2.8 percentage points. Third, participation is inversely
related to both consumption and income, but not to temporary shocks.
One possible interpretation of these results is that the low participation rate depends on low
expected bene¯ts of the program for some eligible households. Only su±ciently poor households,
with children who would have gone to school anyway, and with relatively easy access to health
centers, enroll in Oportunidades. The low incentives to participate could be due to a mix of
uncertainty about eligibility (e.g. for households who suspect they may not be poor enough),
and inadequate monetary incentives (e.g. for children who work). It would be interesting to
experiment with changes in the targeting rules. For example, one could identify some strong
correlates of poverty that the potential recipients can easily recognize and o®er the program to
all households with that given set of characteristics.17
One alternative explanation for our results is that poorer households may have better access
to information about the program. For example, since the program was advertised by driving
around the treated neighborhoods, it is possible that households with a higher opportunity
cost of time, such as less poor families, may have not been aware of its existence. However,
while low participation in the early stages may be compatible with scarce information about
the program's existence or its rules, the enrollment rate in 2004 is only marginally higher than
the one in 2003. Moreover, although the intensity of advertising may be correlated with locality
characteristics, explaining part of the observed positive correlation of poverty and availability of
health centers with enrollment, information alone can hardly explain the di®erent enrollment
rates by age, school enrollment or employment status of potential scholarship bene¯ciaries.
17One simple approach would be geographic targeting, e.g. by o®ering the program to all the households who
live within a certain postal code.
20To conclude, the available evidence suggests that both insu±cient information and inadequate
¯nancial incentives may be responsible for the observed low participation rate to Oportunidades,
and that further research to estimate the relative importance of these determinants is needed.
Irrespective of the relative importance of the incentive and information motives, participa-
tion appears to be correlated with permanent, rather than temporary factors. Poverty level
and consumption are strongly signi¯cant; shocks such as loss of business and natural disasters
do not have a statistical e®ect.
6 Estimating the e®ect of Oportunidades on consumption
In this section we present the estimates of the AIT and ATT e®ects of Oportunidades on
consumption. We estimate the e®ect on food and non-food consumption separately. The
former is most likely measured with higher precision since the survey questions about food
consumption are asked referring to consumption in the previous week. The recall period for
non-food consumption, on the other hand, is longer, ranging between one month and one year.
We converted all data into monthly values.
We estimate the AIT by di®erence-in-di®erence local linear regression matching. To estimate
the ATT, we take the estimated intent to treat (IT) parameter for each value of the propensity
score P(X) = P(Z = 1jX) and divide it by the probability of participation, P(D = 1jZ =
1;P(X)), integrating over the density of the propensity score for the participants, as in equation
(1). We estimate the propensity score by probit, and the standard errors of the AIT and ATT
parameters using the block bootstrap, where the block is the locality (a locality is a set of
\manzanas"), using 200 repetitions.18 We re-estimate the propensity score in each iteration.
The chosen bandwidth is 0.6. However, the results are fairly stable when we use di®erent
values of the bandwidth; the estimated e®ects are unchanged with bandwidths that range
18We also experimented with 500 repetitions, but the standard errors did not di®er substantially from the
200-repetition ones.
21between 0.25 and 0.8, and increase by about 10% with smaller and larger bandwidths. We also
tried estimating the treatment e®ects using the 5 nearest neighbors to identify the matched
counterfactual; the point estimates were fairly similar to the local linear regression ones.
To show the sensitivity of the results to di®erent conditioning sets, we estimate treat-
ment e®ects using three di®erent propensity scores. First, our preferred score, computed from
household-level variables and GDP state growth to control for the possibility of state-speci¯c
unobserved trends without causing major support problems (panel 4 in Figure 4). Second, the
propensity score with state dummies instead of GDP growth (panel 3 in Figure 4), in which case
we end up matching about half the treated households with 5% of the control ones. Third, the
propensity score computed using household characteristics only and no geographic variables
(panel 2 in Figure 4). A comparison of the estimated treatment e®ect using these di®erent
scores will provide indirect evidence of the relevance of di®erential trends.
Tables 8 and 9 report the estimated treatment e®ects for consumption both in logs and
levels. The advantage of estimating treatment e®ects in levels is that the estimates are directly
comparable to the level of the grant. However, the presence of in°ation, albeit common across
the areas, a®ects the results as it has a multiplicative e®ect. We deal with issue by de°ating
the 2003 and 2004 consumption levels using average CPI values, likely measuring the true
in°ation with error. This is not a problem for the results in log since in°ation cancels out from
a di®erence in logs, so we do not have to worry about measurement error issues.19 In both
tables we report the AIT and ATT e®ects of the program on consumption in 2003 and in 2004,
that is one and two years after the beginning of Oportunidades.
According to the estimates from the ¯rst panel of Table 8, food consumption increases
by 4.8% in 2003 and 7.2% in 2004 among eligible households in program blocks irrespective
of participation (this is an estimate of the AIT), but these e®ects are imprecisely estimated
19There are a few families reporting zero non-food consumption, but these are only 11, 34, and 23 in the
three data waves, so the fact that the values of log consumption for those households are set to missing is not a
concern.
22and statistically insigni¯cant at the conventional levels. The ATT are instead positive and
signi¯cant in 2003 and 2004, and amount to 0.16 and 0.23. Non-food consumption does not
change signi¯cantly; several point estimates are negative, and the estimates are generally very
imprecise. In the second panel, where we substitute state GDP growth with state dummies for
the computation of the propensity score, the results do not change much. The point estimates
of the e®ects on food consumption are slightly larger, but still within the previous estimates'
con¯dence intervals, and the e®ects of non-food consumption remain statistically insigni¯cant.
These results indicate that GDP growth might be doing a good job of capturing di®erential
trends between treatment and control areas, although, relative to the ¯gures in the second
panel, the e®ects are not estimated with more precision. These results reveal that the program
causes a large increase in food consumption.
In the bottom panel, when we completely eliminate state dummies or growth rates, the
precision of the estimates improves considerably, re°ecting the absence of support problems
discussed in Section 4 for this particular case. However, the point estimates of the e®ects also
change dramatically. In particular, the estimates of the ATT e®ects for food consumption
increase by about 8 to 11 percentage points, compared with the point estimates from the top
panel, becoming 0.24 and 0.34 in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Moreover, the estimated e®ects
on non-food consumption become positive, signi¯cant, and quite large in 2004, with an AIT of
0.15 and an ATT of 0.39, for instance.
We believe these latter sets of estimates are too large, consistent with the evidence from
Section 4 suggesting a faster growth rate in treatment areas. Note also that the average
treatment e®ect for eligible households in rural areas are respectively 0.13 and 0.15 for food
and non-food log-consumption for the ¯rst 20 months since the program beginning.20
In Table 9, we repeat the exercise on the levels of food and non-food consumption. The
20Authors' calculations. Since the participation rate to the rural component of Oportunidades was roughly
97%, the di®erence between this average treatment e®ect and the ATT is negligible.
23general picture is consistent with the one that emerges from Table 8. In particular, as before
we ¯nd larger e®ects in 2004 than in 2003, insigni¯cant estimates of the e®ect on non-food
consumption, and larger (though more precise) point estimates when we fail to control for
di®erential trends, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 9. Now we can assess the absolute
magnitude of the program e®ects on consumption. Using the results from the top panel, the
e®ects on food and non-food consumption are respectively 168 and -57 in 2003, and 282 and
141 in 2004. These results suggest that part of the transfer is probably saved in 2003, as the
estimate of the ATT is far lower than the average transfer of 316 pesos, while all the transfer
is likely consumed in 2004, as monthly transfers for that year average 367 pesos. Overall, the
average marginal propensity to consume for these two time periods is roughly 80%. This is
consistent with the evidence from rural areas, where 88% of the transfer was consumed in the
¯rst two and a half years since the program started (Gertler et al. 2006). The gradual increase
in consumption over time is also consistent with the evidence from rural areas, where food
consumption per adult equivalent among eligible households increased by 8, 14, and 17% about
6, 12, and 18 months after the beginning of the program.21
Measuring the absolute value of the program e®ect on consumption is also interesting be-
cause we can indirectly check which propensity score is associated with plausible estimates of
the program e®ects, and from there infer something about the validity of the identi¯cation as-
sumptions. Obviously, neither the conditional independence assumption (CIA) nor the SUTVA
are testable, but obtaining estimates that are grossly inconsistent with our priors is a ¯rst step
to questioning their validity. In this particular case, since the the program take-up was so low,
we do not think that program indirect e®ects on the eligible households in treatment areas
who chose not to participate are likely, as we explained in Section 4. Thus, a comparison of
the estimated e®ects may provide information on the whether the CIA holds for a given set
of covariates. Comparing the estimated e®ects with and without controlling for state growth
21Authors' calculations.
24rates (the ¯rst and third panels of Table 9) shows that failing to control for di®erential trends
produces bigger estimates of the treatment e®ects than when we add state GDP growth. This
result is consistent with the evidence from Section 4, which suggested that areas where the
program is o®ered started growing at a faster rate in 2002. Therefore, the estimated e®ects in
panel 3 are probably upward biased, as they are partly re°ecting the faster growth in treatment
areas. Further, the estimated e®ects for 2004 in the bottom panel sum to a total consumption
increase of 683 pesos. This is almost twice as much as the average transfer size for 2004, which
is 367 pesos, thus providing additional indirect validation that these estimates are larger than
the \true" e®ects. This result, together with our evidence of the possible existence of di®er-
ential trends, suggests that the CIA is likely violated when we fail to control for these trends,
and that the estimates on the ¯rst and second panel of the table are based on more realistic
assumptions than the ones from the third panel.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have looked at the e®ect of Oportunidades on consumption of food and non-
food items. There are several reasons why such an exercise is useful. First, consumption
is interesting per se, as it is an obvious determinant of utility and, as such, might re°ect
individual perceptions about future opportunities and the like. Second, in a situation in which
the absence of a randomization implies the use of di®erent sets of assumptions, which might
generate di®erent results, the consumption results can be useful to assess indirectly the relative
merits of di®erent assumptions. This is possible because we have a strong prior on the range of
estimates one should obtain given the level of the grant. Third, although not analyzed here, the
study of di®erent components of consumption can be important in assessing the e®ectiveness
of the program in reaching the intended bene¯ciaries (children) and achieving its stated goals
(investment in human capital).
25In the ¯rst part of the paper we analyzed two important problems for the current evaluation.
First, we studied the trade o® between conditioning on a set of variables that make the condi-
tional independence assumption credible, and the lack of common support. More speci¯cally,
we believe that the presence of unobservable di®erential trends between treatment and control
areas might be an issue in our data, as it would jeopardize the use of the di®erence-in-di®erence
techniques used in this study. The second problem we studied is the low participation into the
program.
We found our methodological worries, in particular the worry about di®erential trends,
to be important. We suggest ways to control for them that can potentially be used in other
applications. In particular, we ¯nd that trends seem to be di®erent between treatment and
control areas and tend to be more positive in treatment areas. However, we also argue that
these trends can be reasonably captured by controlling for growth in state GDP.
We show that the low enrollment rate may be possibly caused by a low expected bene¯t of
the program and that poverty is a very strong correlate of participation. However, we cannot
rule out alternative explanations, such as low information about the program existence and
features.
As for the e®ects of the program, we ¯nd that treated households tend to consume a large
fraction of the grant, similarly to treated households in rural areas. Moreover, we ¯nd that
a large fraction of the increase is in food. These results are not surprising, given that the
households most likely to participate are the poorest ones; these families are both the least
likely to save a part of the transfer to invest it, and the most likely to spend it to improve their
nutrition.
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29Table 1: Average monthly non-durable consumption
2002 2003 2004
C T pvalue C T pvalue C T pvalue
total 2291 1929 0.000 2375 2155 0.000 2299 2256 0.448
(2101) (1826) (2034) (1911)
food 1463 1280 0.001 1357 1329 0.114 1368 1389 0.375
(1200) (1126) (1210) (1177)
non food 828 649 999 825 0.000 930 866 0.145
(884) (699) (823) (733)
T= Treatment group, C=Control group (as by locality). All the tables refer to poor households.
Poor households in T include eligible families not receiving the program. Values of consumption at 2002 prices
in parentheses.
30Table 2: Participation into the Program and Amount of Transfer
2003 2004
Participation (for the poor in treatment areas) 51.8% 53.9%
Average amount received (monthly) 357 433
(316) (367)
Transfer sizes at 2002 prices in parentheses.
31Table 3: Distribution of areas by state and average poverty level
State State name Sample Block Distribution (%) GDP growth
code % Control Treatment 2000 2001 2002
4 Campeche 1.70 0 100 0.081 0.047 0.011
6 Colima 0.31 9 91 0.020 -0.035 0.027
7 Chiapas 15.28 23 77 0.040 0.014 0.030
11 Guanajuato 1.71 58 42 0.074 0.009 0.049
12 Guerrero 9.35 6 94 0.027 0.006 -0.010
13 Hidalgo 0.41 25 75 0.042 -0.020 -0.005
15 Mexico 21.19 76 24 0.069 0.011 -0.010
16 Michoacan 4.14 14 86 0.012 -0.013 -0.007
17 Morelos 4.31 0 100 0.049 0.035 -0.009
21 Puebla 7.36 71 29 0.043 0.011 -0.012
24 San Luis Potosi 0.03 0 100 0.061 0.001 0.008
25 Sinaloa 0.51 98 2 0.083 0.019 -0.012
26 Sonora 2.50 94 6 0.073 0.008 -0.045
27 Tabasco 5.23 50 50 0.049 0.006 -0.018
28 Tamaulipas 2.44 23 77 0.075 -0.025 0.036
29 Tlaxcala 4.39 84 16 0.067 0.028 -0.022
30 Veracruz 19.15 2 98 0.040 -0.004 0.002
The frequencies are computed considering only observations with non-missing income data in 2003.
32Table 4: Di®erences in pre-program trends
Income Employment
Head Spouse
T 100.145 -81.685 0.014 0.006 0.053 0.041
[134.150] [102.094] [0.017] [0.014] [0.022]** [0.014]***
T £ t -212.018 -0.012 -0.014
[93.420]** [0.011] [0.016]
T £ t2 45.649 0.003 0.004
[21.784]** [0.002] [0.004]
T £ y2000 -15.092 -0.003 0.01
[33.689] [0.005] [0.006]*
T £ y2001 -87.373 -0.001 0.001
[40.369]** [0.007] [0.007]
T £ y2002 77.848 0.008 0.03
[85.673] [0.008] [0.016]*
Trend: test of joint
signi¯cance [0.066] [0.279] [0.311]
Standard errors [in brackets] clustered at the locality level. ***,**,* = signi¯cant at 10, 5, 1% level. P-value of
the test of joint signi¯cance.
33Table 5: Di®erences in pre-program trends
Income growth rate
1 2 3




State ¯xed e®ects No No Yes
Observations 23066
Standard errors clustered at the locality level. ***,**,* = signi¯cant at 10, 5, 1% level.
34Table 6: Partial e®ects of an additional child on program participation, by children age and
status.
Neither school nor work School Work
Age
0-5 -0.023 0.039 |
[0.011]** [0.024]
6-12 -0.038 0.036 |
[0.025] [0.010]***
13-15 -0.024 0.055 -0.065
[0.029] [0.016]*** [0.037]*
16-20 -0.005 -0.002 -0.040
[0.026] [0.034] [0.020]**
Obs. 5451
Linear probability model estimates. Standard errors clustered at the locality level. *,**,*** = signi¯cant at 10,
5, 1% level.
35Table 7: Selected determinants of program participation: partial e®ects and means.
LPM Mean
(1) (2)
food consumption(a) -0.004 1.280
[0.001]*** [3.655]






primary school(b) 1.707 0.002
[17.246] [0.001]
lower secondary(b) -68.157 0.0006
[75.594] [0.0004]
upper secondary(b) 1.941 0.0005
[73.614] [0.0003]










loss of business 0.171 0.005
[0.126] [0.069]
natural disaster -0.001 0.045
[0.034] [0.207]
Obs. 5451
(a): consumption and income are in thousand pesos.
(b): number of schools or centers per household in the
locality. Linear probability model estimates in column (1). Standard errors clustered at the locality level.
*,**,*** = signi¯cant at 10, 5, 1% level. Sample averages and standard deviations in column (2).
36Table 8: Treatment e®ect estimates for food and non-food consumption in logs using di®erent
propensity scores.
food nonfood
2003 2004 2003 2004
State gdp growth, no geographic variables
AIT 0.048 0.072 -0.161 -0.021
[0.042] [0.046] [0.117] [0.123]
ATT 0.164 0.231 -0.205 0.086
[0.082]** [0.095]** [0.262] [0.227]
State dummies, no geographic variables
AIT 0.072 0.089 -0.092 -0.004
[0.051] [0.053]* [0.117] [0.141]
ATT 0.208 0.265 -0.085 -0.118
[0.102]** [0.109]** [0.227] [0.261]
No state dummies and no geographic variables
AIT 0.089 0.137 0.019 0.151
[0.025]*** [0.023]*** [0.056] [0.078]*
ATT 0.242 0.349 0.120 0.394
[0.054]*** [0.057]*** [0.117] [0.156]***
Obs. 7320 6826 7295 6801
Standard errors computed using block-bootstrap with 200 repetitions. The block is the locality. *,**,*** =
signi¯cant at 10, 5, 1% level.
37Table 9: Treatment e®ect estimates for food and non-food consumption in levels using di®erent
propensity scores.
food nonfood
2003 2004 2003 2004
State gdp growth, no geographic variables
AIT 44.06 86.12 -58.31 31.21
[57.00] [46.20]* [64.82] [57.96]
ATT 168.54 282.85 -57.00 141.57
[108.87]* [95.82]*** [120.88] [110.58]
State dummies, no geographic variables
AIT 75.62 86.33 -26.78 29.30
[62.19] [54.43] [59.03] [67.32]
ATT 228.28 287.41 1.84 139.52
[123.28]* [114.18]*** [113.86] [127.85]
No state dummies and no geographic variables
AIT 102.15 150.28 22.34 110.22
[31.03]*** [27.46]*** [29.37] [39.49]***
ATT 279.58 400.66 92.90 282.87
[65.59]*** [65.88]*** [60.40] [81.63]***
Obs. 7322 6824 7320 6829
Standard errors computed using block-bootstrap with 200 repetitions. The block is the locality. *,**,*** =
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Figure 3: Average spouse employment for poor households in treatment and control areas,
1999-2002.
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